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Abstract 
In this article, we present information from a unique database of labour market reforms implemented in 
111 developed and developing countries between 2008 and 2014. We show that the number of reforms 
implemented each year has gradually increased and that the majority of reforms were passed in 
advanced economies – with EU member states being particularly active reformers. Moreover, the results 
show that permanent contracts and collective bargaining were the most popular areas of policy 
intervention in the labour market domain and that the majority of reforms decreased the strictness of 
employment protection legislation – although large disparities emerge across world regions in this 
respect. Finally, the paper compares our database to different indicators of employment regulation in 
order to check the consistency of our results.  
  
                                                          
1 This article is partially based on Sections 1 and 2 of Cazes et al. (2012), prepared by Sameer Khatiwada and 
Miguel Á. Malo. We thank ILO Research Department colleagues for their valuable comments and suggestions. 
They are not in any way responsible for the remaining errors. The opinions expressed in this article correspond 
exclusively to those of the authors and do not engage the institutions to which they are affiliated.  
2 Authors are associated with the Central European University (Hungary), the Research Department of the ILO 
(Switzerland), the University of Salamanca (Spain) and the Research Department of the ILO (Switzerland), 
respectively. Corresponding author: pignatti@ilo.org.  
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I. Introduction 
Employment growth remains tepid in both developed and developing countries and unemployment 
levels are set to increase globally over the next years. Moreover, large disparities in labour market 
opportunities persist within countries across different societal groups – e.g. women and young people 
– as well as across countries. Globally, the jobs gap is estimated at 61 million jobs for 2014 with respect 
to pre-crisis trends and forecasts suggest that it will reach 80 million jobs by 2019 (ILO 2015a). The 
attention of policy makers towards labour market reforms has increased during the recent crisis, as these 
interventions have been viewed as important policy tools to address the emerging labour market 
challenges. In advanced economies, reforms of employment regulation have been regarded as helpful 
policy instruments to reduce layoffs and/or incentivise hiring in periods of high joblessness and limited 
fiscal space. By comparison, in developing economies, the attention to labour market regulation has 
been related to their importance in contributing to economic resilience in times of fluctuating global 
demand and international trade.  
In order to monitor these trends, we developed a database collecting recent changes to labour market 
regulation in 111 developed and developing countries between 2008 and 2014. The database 
distinguishes between different areas of labour market regulation (permanent contracts, temporary 
contracts, collective dismissals, collective bargaining, working hours and other forms of employment); 
while seeking to provide a comprehensive coverage of all geographical regions – thus substantially 
expanding with respect to traditional sources of information that are currently available. We compared 
national and international data and cross-checked the gathered information with primary and secondary 
sources. For each change in labour market regulation, we noted together the content of the reform, the 
respective year of approval, the policy domain where the change intervened, as well as whether the 
reform increased or decreased existing levels of labour market regulation. If a single reform introduced 
several changes to the legislation (so-called “umbrella laws” or reform packages), these changes were 
coded separately. 
Employment protection can be achieved either through legislation or through collective bargaining 
agreements. Studies have shown that labour legislation tends to set minimum standards, while collective 
agreements tend to include provisions that are generally more generous to employees (Venn, 2009).3 
These institutions, when combined with effective labour market policies (e.g. unemployment insurance, 
minimum wage and activation policies), ensure labour market security – a more comprehensive 
understanding of protection that goes beyond one job or employer. Studies have shown that there is a 
non-linear relationship between employment protection and labour market outcomes and most countries 
tend to be on the plateau where tinkering with the legislation or weakening collective bargaining does 
not have a statistically significant impact on employment rates (ILO, 2012a). These mechanisms 
naturally tend to differ between advanced and developing economies, since labour markets function 
differently in the two groups of countries (e.g. high share of informal employment in the latter group).  
This paper aims to track recent reform efforts in both the area of employment protection legislation 
(EPL) and collective bargaining in developed and developing economies. Other areas of employment 
policy such as passive and active policies and minimum wages are instead left outside the scope of the 
analysis. This analysis expands the attention towards areas of legislation that are generally not covered 
by traditional EPL indicators (e.g. working hours, other forms of employment) and also expanding the 
                                                          
3 Collective agreement coverage ranges from less than 20 per cent to more than 90 per cent and it tends to occur 
primarily at the firm level.  
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geographical coverage to include a large number of developing countries for which little information is 
currently available. Importantly, in doing so, this database does not aim to substitute – but rather to 
complement – the information provided by traditional indicators of strictness of employment 
regulation.4 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides an overview of EPL and 
collective bargaining with a focus on their theoretical links with macroeconomic performance and 
labour market outcomes. It also looks at the complementarities between EPL and collective bargaining 
and draws out the importance of looking at these institutions in tandem, in order to better understand 
the level of employment protection in a particular country. Section III includes an overview of changes 
in EPL and collective bargaining between 2008 and 2014 – covering over 100 countries where 
qualitative data is available in terms of legislative changes. Section IV provides a regional overview of 
the changes; while, Section V provides a comparison of our findings to other   indicators of employment 
regulation – such as the OECD EPL indicator. Section VI concludes the paper.    
  
                                                          
4 Indeed, this article does not seek to use the available information to construct an indicator of employment 
regulation; but rather to provide a description of recent reform trends in developed and developing countries. 
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II. Literature review  
Employment protection legislation (EPL) 
Employment protection legislation is one of the many labour market institutions designed to give 
employees protection against unfair dismissals as well as from the fluctuations in earned income, which 
normally occur when the employee loses his job – individually or collectively. Generally speaking, EPL 
governs firms’ ability to fire employees, while it also regulates the use of temporary workers. However, 
there are exemptions to EPL, which usually depend on the size of the firm. A well-functioning system 
of EPL – which balances the need to provide fair treatment as well as income security to workers with 
firms’ need to adjust employment (hours and/or jobs) based on fluctuations in aggregate demand – is 
an important determinant of a country’s ability to weather an economic downturn and create 
employment in times of expansion. Economic theory says that EPL has a direct impact on the allocation 
of labour (especially on the dynamics of labour demand), but since internationally comparable 
quantitative measures of EPL have numerous problems, the labour market impact of EPL still remains 
a debated empirical question (Bertola et al., 2000).  
EPL has three main pillars: i) termination of regular employment (permanent or open-ended contracts), 
ii) hiring of temporary workers, and iii) collective dismissals.5 With respect to termination of regular 
employment, legislation addresses substantial and procedural requirements (administrative and legal), 
notice periods and severance pay. Severance pay is a direct cost of dismissals for employers, and it is 
usually defined as a number of wage days (or months) per seniority year. Legislation usually requires 
either a valid reason for a dismissal or a list of valid reasons that generally include personal 
circumstances of the employee (e.g. conduct and capacity related reasons) and economic reasons (e.g. 
loss in revenues). If the dismissal is challenged and the employer cannot show that there are valid 
reasons, the dismissal can be declared unjustified and allows for remedies in the form of reinstatement 
or compensation.      
The second pillar of EPL covers temporary contracts, which are generally aimed at giving firms 
flexibility in adjusting employment (by hiring temporary workers) during economic fluctuations. In 
order to prevent the excessive use of temporary contracts, there are laws governing their use, the chief 
among which is the regulation that stipulates the reasons for which a firm can hire workers on temporary 
contracts. For example, temporary contracts are generally accepted for seasonal works, and also for 
employing specific groups of workers such as young people and new entrants to the labour market 
(Skedinger, 2010). The primary restriction an employer faces is the length of time for which he/she can 
keep an employee on a temporary contract.       
Finally, the third pillar of EPL is the regulation governing collective dismissals, which tends to comprise 
stringent restrictions because it usually entails additional legal requirements (information, consultation 
etc.). The definition of collective dismissals depends on the number of employees concerned and it 
tends to vary among countries. Collective dismissals have broader economic and social consequences; 
hence regulation is meant to strike a right balance between the socio-economic costs of collective 
dismissals (on individuals, enterprises, and the community as a whole) and the need for the employer 
to adjust employment levels. The requirements put in place for employers include mandatory 
consultations with union or worker’s organizations, notification to and approval from the public 
                                                          
5 ILO Convention No. 158 concerning termination of employment by an employer provides for minimum 
standards for individual and collective dismissal. The convention can be consulted at the following link: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C158  
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administration offices, priority rules for selecting workers (or selection criteria), priority rules for re-
employment, in some cases higher severance pay than in cases of individual dismissals, and mandatory 
steps to help the laid-off employees find new employment through job-placement services and training 
(Muller, 2011; Skedinger, 2010).    
The empirical evidence on the effects of EPL can be divided into the following three categories: i) 
cross-country studies using aggregate data; ii) cross-country studies using disaggregate data; and iii) 
within country studies using disaggregate data (Figure 1). Most commonly found empirical evidence is 
of the first type, but in the last few years there has been a notable shift towards using disaggregated data 
and also there is increasingly more reliance on within country evidence. However, irrespective of the 
methodology used, there is a general consensus that the impact of EPL on employment/unemployment 
levels is rather mixed. However, in terms of the distribution of effects of EPL, there is stronger evidence 
that vulnerable groups such as youth and women could be negatively affected by high levels of EPL (as 
reforms have often changed regulations only for a subset of the workforce).  
Figure 1: Empirical evidence on the effects of employment protection legislation (EPL) 
 
Note: Disaggregated data refers to disaggregation by industry and firms, and most recently by individuals. The summary 
is based on over 100 studies conducted since 1990.  
Source: Cazes et al. (2012).  
  
Within the cross-country studies using aggregate data, some studies find that employment declines and 
unemployment increases with the strictness of EPL (for e.g., Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Botero et. 
al, 2004;  Feldmann, 2003, 2009; Heckman and Pagés-Serra, 2000; Nickell, 1997; and Lazear, 1990); 
while other studies find no effect or even a positive one (for e.g., Allard and Lindert, 2007; Baccaro and 
Rei, 2007; Cazes and Nesporova, 2007; ILO, 2015b; Garibaldi and Violante, 2005; and Griffith et al. 
Cross-country studies 
using aggregate data
• Mixed and rather small 
effects on aggregate 
levels of employment/ 
unemployment
• Negative effects on 
vulnerable groups, 
especially youth
• Hump-shaped 
relationship between EPL 
and growth
Cross-country studies 
using disaggregate data
• Mixed effects on 
aggregate levels of 
employment/ 
unemployment
• Reduced employee 
turnover (job creation/ 
destruction)
• Negative effects on 
productivity
• Weak/ negative 
connection between EPL 
and perceived job 
security
Within country studies 
using mostly disaggregate 
data
• Mixed and rather small 
effects on aggregate 
levels of employment/ 
unemployment
• Reduced employee 
turnover (job creation/ 
destruction)
• Negative effects on 
productivity
• Increased worker 
absenteeism 
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2007). Meanwhile, studies in this stream of literature show that there is a hump shaped relationship 
between EPL and growth. This means thatan increase in EPL from a low level leads to increased GDP 
per capita, but the effect turns negative above a certain threshold (Skedinger, 2010).   
However, there are several problems with cross-country studies with aggregate data. The first one 
relates to measurement issues with the indices of EPL. The OECD’s EPL indicator is the most 
commonly used, but it had very few observations over time until 2006. It is only recently that the data 
has gotten more extensive. Second, self-constructed indices – used by several studies – have 
comparability problems. Third, the problem of reverse causality is persistent across several studies (it 
is difficult to separate whether unemployment levels are affecting the stringency of EPL or vice versa). 
Given these weaknesses, one of the main strengths of cross-country studies based on aggregate data is 
that they tend to capture general equilibrium effects that are not possible with disaggregated data 
without strong assumptions. However, the advantage of studies that use disaggregated data is that they 
tease out effects that could be hidden in aggregate data (Skedinger, 2010). 
Cross-country studies that use data disaggregated by industry, region, and size indicate that there is a 
measurable negative impact on job reallocation (job creation and destruction) but that this effect varies 
by industry (Caballero et al, 2004; Gomez-Salvador et al., 2004; Haltiwanger et al., 2006; Messina and 
Vallanti, 2007). When disaggregating by contract type, job creation and destruction are much higher 
for temporary than for open-ended contracts. For example, among large firms in Spain, it is 5 to 7 times 
higher (Garcia-Serrano, 1998; Amuedo-Dorantes and Malo, 2008), but job creation and destruction 
move together for both types of contracts over the business cycle. In any case, different studies find the 
use of temporary contracts as partial buffers against business cycle fluctuations (Bentolila and Dolado, 
1994; García-Martínez and Malo, 2007). 
Meanwhile, some studies also show that there is a negative impact of EPL on productivity (see for e.g. 
Bassanini et al, 2009). However, these results vary considerably by industries and it is practically 
impossible to aggregate at the national level. In contrast, there are studies that cast doubt on the negative 
impact on productivity by showing that stronger EPL increases patents at the industry level (Acharya 
et al, 2009). The advantage of using disaggregated data is that the problem of reverse causality is less 
severe, and, at the same time, the likelihood of omitted variable bias entering into the estimates is 
relatively low. However, one clear disadvantage is that the results depend crucially on the choice of 
industries (Skedinger, 2010).      
Besides cross-country studies, there are several within-country studies that have exploited the fact that 
in some countries EPL was made more/less stringent for small firms while it was left unchanged for 
large firms (Skedinger, 2010). In other words, there were partial labour market reforms, which in turn 
provide treatment and control groups. Besides the natural experiment provided by changes in EPL, one 
of the main advantages of within country studies is that it controls for country specific conditions that 
cross-country studies cannot do. Findings from this group of studies indicate that EPL decreases flows 
in the labour market, but the effects on employment levels are mixed. Meanwhile, studies show that 
there is a negative impact on worker’s productivity as measured by absenteeism and sickness absence.   
It is finally important to consider separately those studies focusing on the effect of EPL on labour market 
outcomes in developing economies (Boeri et al., 2008; Cazes and Verick, 2013). Indeed, most studies 
on the effects of EPL on labour market and economic performances reviewed above cover developed 
economies – and their results cannot be easily extended to developing countries. However, there are 
some recent attempts to investigate the impact of labour legislation in developing countries using both 
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cross-country and within-country information. In developing economies, the studies usually aim at 
analysing the impact of legislation on employment and unemployment rates – as in developed 
economies – but also on the level of informal employment – under the assumption that more stringent 
legislation may increase firms’ incentives to remain informal. Some cross-country studies confirm this 
hypothesis and show that higher levels of workers’ protection in developing countries are associated 
with higher unemployment and informality (Botero et al. 2004; Djankoc and Ramalho, 2008; Freeman, 
2010; Micco and Pages, 2006; Lafontaine and Sivadasan, 2009). However, other cross-country studies 
do not find any statistically significant effect of EPL on aggregate labour market outcomes (Freeman, 
2010; Heckman and Pagés, 2000; ILO, 2015b). Finally, a number of studies using within country 
disaggregated data (generally for India or Latin American countries) find that more stringent regulation 
is associated with lower employment and productivity levels (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Almeida and 
Carneiro, 2008).  
Collective bargaining  
Collective bargaining is a process of negotiation between employer and workers that determines the 
employment relationship, and in particular, wages, working time and working standards. By design, 
collective bargaining entails a process of joint decision making where work-related issues between 
employer and workers are negotiated.6 However, depending on the structure and coverage of collective 
bargaining, it can also be a means to regulate the labour market. For instance in some countries (for e.g. 
Denmark and Iceland), EPL is mostly regulated through collective bargaining agreements. At the same 
time, in many cases governments set the rules for collective bargaining but allow the social partners to 
self-regulate. Therefore the conventional distinction between EPL as being government enacted and 
collective bargaining as a result of negotiations between employers and workers does not always hold.  
Meanwhile, collective bargaining occurs at several levels, namely inter-sectoral (or national), sectoral 
and firm level (see Table 1). The most prevalent types are multi-level bargaining, which involve 
national, sectoral and firm level bargaining (varies by country). In some cases, national level bargaining 
represents the dominant level for negotiations (e.g. Belgium, France, Finland and Norway); with 
sectoral and enterprise agreements complementing the norms stipulated at the central level. Instead, in 
other countries (such as Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Ireland), enterprise bargaining represents the 
prevailing level of negotiation. Since wages and working time are important components of economic 
production, depending on the degree of coverage, collective bargaining over these factors has a direct 
impact on labour market and macroeconomic performance. This is particularly important because the 
institutional structure of collective bargaining (i.e. whether it occurs mostly at the national or enterprise 
level) has a direct impact on the level of coverage of collective agreements.  
                                                          
6 For more, see: ILO Convention No. 98 concerning the application of the principles of the right to organize and 
bargain collectively (http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C098) as 
well as Convention No. 154 concerning the promotion of collective bargaining 
(http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_ILO_CODE:C154). 
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Table 1 : Collective bargaining over wages, 2015  
 
Note: X = existing level of wage bargaining, XX = important, but not dominant level of wage bargaining; XXX 
= dominant level of wage bargaining.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ICTWSS and ETUI national reports.  
There is a considerable literature on the links between the degree of centralization of collective 
bargaining and macroeconomic performance. In particular, examining the 1970s and the 1980s, Bruno 
and Sachs (1985) find a positive association between centralization and macroeconomic performance 
as measured by lower inflation and/or lower unemployment rates. The rationale for this empirical result 
lies primarily in the fact that firms tend to internalize externalities when bargaining takes place at a 
centralized level (for e.g., national level). In the late 1980s, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) opened a long-
lasting debate, questioning this linear association by showing that there is a hump-shaped relationship 
between centralization of collective bargaining and macroeconomic performance. In other words, the 
best macroeconomic results are obtained for full centralization (i.e., at national level) and for full 
decentralization (i.e., at firm level), while the worst macroeconomic results are associated with 
intermediate levels of centralization.     
Following the study by Calmfors and Driffill (1988), academic research has focussed on either 
supporting or rejecting the non-linear link between collective bargaining and macroeconomic 
performance. One of the main criticisms of the study is that the authors focussed heavily on the level at 
which agreements were struck, and not enough on informal forms of coordination amongst social 
partners. For example, Japan is a decentralized but highly coordinated economy. After taking into 
National 
level
Sectoral 
level
Firm 
level
National 
level
Sectoral 
level
Firm 
level
Australia . XX XX Latvia . X XXX
Austria . XXX X Lithuania X X XXX
Belgium XXX XX X Luxembourg . XX XX
Brazil XX XX Malaysia . . XXX
Bulgaria X X XXX Malta . . XXX
Canada . . XXX Mexico . . XXX
Chile . . XXX Netherlands . XXX X
China . X XXX New Zealand . . XXX
Cyprus . XX XX Norway XXX XX X
Czech Republic . X XXX Philippines . . XXX
Denmark X XXX X Poland . X XXX
Estonia X X XXX Portugal . XXX X
Finland XXX XX X Romania . X XXX
France XXX XX X Russia X XX X
Germany . XXX X Singapore . . XXX
Greece X X XXX Slovakia . XX XX
Hungary X X XXX Slovenia X XXX X
India . XX XXX South Africa . XXX X
Indonesia . X XXX Spain XX XX X
Ireland X X XXX Sweden . XXX X
Israel . XX XX Switzerland . XXX X
Italy . XXX X Turkey . . XXX
Japan . . XXX UK . X XXX
Korea . . XXX USA . . XXX
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account the degree of coordination in countries, the relationship appeared to be rather linear.7 In 1997 
the OECD also showed that there was no convincing evidence in support of the results obtained by 
Calmfors and Driffill (OECD, 1997). Most recently, some studies have shown that collective bargaining 
institutions have no impact on employment performance in the OECD countries (see Traxler and 
Brandl, 2011). Meanwhile, economic research has evolved towards analysing the impact of collective 
bargaining on macroeconomic performance by examining the type of shocks, while industrial relations 
research has focussed on looking at the impact of collective bargaining on wage inequality.    
Macroeconomic performance differs depending on the type of shocks and the collective bargaining 
structure. Full centralization allows countries to better respond to generalized macroeconomic shocks, 
while when the shock is sector or industry specific, such systems tend to suffer and are slower to 
respond. This is mainly due to the fact that sector specific shocks ultimately require adjustments to 
relative prices for recovery to take place. This shows that besides the design of collective bargaining, 
the type of shocks is pertinent to a better understanding of macroeconomic outcomes (Bentolila et al., 
2012; Blanchard and Galí, 2007, 2010).  
Meanwhile, examining aggregate macroeconomic outcomes could potentially hide the distributional 
impact of collective bargaining. For example, according to the OECD (2004), an intermediate level of 
centralization and coordination increases the relative wage of older workers (55-64) and women. More 
recently, the economic literature in this discipline has focussed on other characteristics of collective 
bargaining and their role in creating nominal wage rigidities. For example, the duration of collective 
agreements, when they cover relatively long time periods, tends to increase nominal wage rigidities. 
This in turn, leads to a higher persistence of unemployment rate deviations from its structure rate 
(Blanchard and Galí, 2010). Furthermore, studies have shown that among advanced economies, 
coverage and centralization of collective bargaining play a role in reducing wage inequalities but the 
size of these effects is rather debatable (see, for e.g. Wallerstein, 1999, and Golden and Londregan, 
2006). In case of developing economies, empirical evidence shows that unions reduce overall wage 
dispersion in the labour market (Hayter and Weinberg, 2011). Within country studies corroborate these 
findings – they show that centralized wage bargaining reduces wage dispersions (Kahn, 1998). 
To sum up the empirical evidence on collective bargaining, since the 1990s there is a trend in Western 
economies towards deregulation and decentralization, despite experiences in Europe (and elsewhere) 
that bargaining at above levels has indeed facilitated the adaptability of enterprises to the 
macroeconomic shocks while saving jobs (mainly through reductions in working hours) (Hayter, 2011). 
Moreover, the discussion over the design of collective bargaining has moved away from stressing the 
virtues of centralization and coordinated structures to emphasizing the virtues of firm-level bargaining. 
Not surprisingly, the period of decentralization and deregulation is also associated with a general 
increase in wage inequality. Despite these findings, the recent financial and economic crisis has further 
accelerated the legal reforms towards increasing decentralization.     
  
                                                          
7 Recent studies tend to focus more on the degree of coordination rather than the level of bargaining. For the 
empirical analyses, this paper also uses coordination instead of bargaining level.  
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Complementarities between EPL and collective bargaining  
In order to truly understand the level of protection in a country, it is important to consider the 
complementarities between EPL and collective bargaining. Studies have shown that in some countries 
it is collective bargaining that determines the level of protection, while for a large set of countries it is 
EPL that governs protection (Freeman, 2010; Venn, 2009). In the last few years, the OECD has started 
to take into account this heterogeneity by including the stringency of collectively bargained provisions 
in their composite indicator for EPL. Furthermore, the OECD has also started considering the 
enforcement of employment protection legislation in their indicator (Venn, 2009).  
Moreover, a majority of studies on EPL argue that its effects are stronger when wages cannot be 
adjusted downwards to compensate for the increased costs due to the legislation (Skedinger, 2010). This 
depends on the collective bargaining framework prevalent in a country, in particular, whether it is 
centralized or decentralized. Also,  if insiders have strong bargaining power, then the likelihood that 
the employer will be able to shift the cost of EPL to the employees is minimal. Hence, it is vital to 
examine the effects of EPL in relation to the collective bargaining framework and other labour market 
institutions prevalent in a country (Cazes et al., 2012; Boeri et al., 2010; Bertola et al., 2000).   
In the case of developing countries, where there is generally a high incidence of informality (ILO, 
2012b), EPL and collective bargaining tend to leave out a large part of workers. Evidence shows that 
labour market institutions such as minimum wage laws, which typically govern the formal sector, also 
tend to have a “lighthouse effect” – i.e. anchoring effect – on informal sector workers as well (Souza 
and Baltar, 1980; Amadeo et al., 2000; Maloney and Nuñez, 2004; Neri, Gonzaga and Camargo, 2000). 
Notwithstanding the challenges that arise when we try to examine the strength of labour market 
institutions and their impact on employment outcomes, with the increasing formalization of informal 
workers in developing and emerging economies, EPL and collective bargaining together provide a good 
snapshot of the level of protection that workers enjoy in these countries (Cazes and Verick, 2013; 
Freeman, 2010).       
Indeed, even a cursory reading of the empirical and theoretical evidence shows that collective 
bargaining and EPL tend to interact in shaping other labour market institutions. This is confirmed by 
Figure 2, which shows that there is a generally positive relation between collective bargaining coverage 
and the strictness of EPL – as measured by the OECD indicator. However, this relation vastly reflects 
the experience of industrialized economies (blue dots in the figure below); while no clear relation can 
be drawn from the experience of developing and emerging economies (in red). For instance, India and 
Turkey have a similar degree of strictness of EPL but extremely different levels of collective bargaining 
coverage. Similarly, Brazil and China have comparable levels of collective bargaining coverage but 
very different degrees of EPL. If however these countries are excluded from the chart, there is a positive 
relationship between the coverage rate and strictness of EPL, with countries such as Ireland and the US 
being at the lower end, while countries such as France and Spain are at the higher end.  
In sum, when we consider both EPL and collective bargaining, we tend to get a better picture of 
employment protection, even though there is no clear relationship between these two institutions at a 
global level. However, as in this article we are using information on these two institutions in over 100 
countries, these descriptive results have a considerable value added to the empirical literature on the 
topic compared to, for example, the OECD indicator covering only industrialized countries and a 
handful of emerging economies, or others available far from being global in their scope (see the 
following sections for more).  
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Figure 2: Collective bargaining coverage and strictness of employment protection legislation, 
2013/14 
 
Note: Data for collective bargaining coverage refers to the most recent year available in the ICTWSS 
database. Data on EPL refers to 2013 (or 2012 when not available) and they capture the level of protection for 
individual and collective dismissals of regular contracts. Blue points represent advanced economies, red 
points developing ones. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD (EPL) and ICTWSS (collective bargaining).  
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III. A global overview of recent labour market reforms on EPL and collective 
bargaining     
In order to understand the changes in employment protection and collective bargaining in the last few 
years, it is key to look at the initial conditions that countries were faced with  
(Figure 3). First, the existing industrial relations and collective bargaining framework played an 
important role in determining how countries responded to the crisis. For example, in countries where 
collective bargaining was relatively strong (as measured by coverage rate and union density), the 
response to the crisis included extensive consultations with social partners. Second, the severity of the 
crisis differed across countries and played an important role in countries’ response. Furthermore, the 
debt overhang exacerbated the response in many troubled economies. Third, international pressures, 
most notably in the European Union, have played an important role in steering some countries toward 
further deregulation of their labour markets. Given the initial conditions, the institutional response has 
greatly varied across countries.  
Figure 3: Understanding collective bargaining and labour market regulation during the 
financial and economic crisis 
 
Source: Cazes et al. (2012).   
As a result, a number of changes to labour market regulation have been approved since the start of the 
crisis in both advanced and developing economies. To monitor these trends, we developed a 
compendium of recent changes to labour market regulation in 111 developed and developing countries 
between 2008 and 2014.8 Although the focus on reforming labour market regulation was relatively 
widespread, clear differences emerge regarding the intensity of the reform process both across areas of 
policy intervention and geographical regions. In order to account for these differences, we classified 
separately legislative changes pertaining to: (i) collective dismissals; (ii) permanent employment 
contracts; (iii) temporary employment contracts; (iv) working hours; (v) other forms of employment – 
such as casual workers and dependent self-employees and (vi) collective bargaining. This classification 
                                                          
8 Sources: LABREF, EPLex, Natlex and ILO (2012a).  
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expands with respect to the more traditional understanding of EPL in order to include policy measures 
that are typically implemented in times of crisis (e.g. reduction in working hours to avoid layoffs), as 
well as to give a more accurate depiction of the changes to the legislation that apply to other forms of 
work beyond the traditional dependent and permanent employment relation (e.g. dependent self-
employees).  
Furthermore, we compared national and international data and cross-checked the gathered information 
with primary and secondary sources. For each change to labour market regulation, we noted together 
the content of the reform, the respective year of approval, the policy domain where the change 
intervened as well as whether the reform increased or decreased existing levels of labour market 
regulation. For the purpose of the analysis, policy interventions that decrease (increase) existing levels 
of labour market regulation are considered as those that make hiring and firing procedures less (more) 
costly and/or less (more) time consuming. For collective bargaining, a reform is considered as 
decreasing (increasing) regulation if it decentralizes (centralizes) collective bargaining towards the firm 
(more central) level. With respect to working hours, reforms that increase (decrease) the ability of the 
employers to set and change working hours are considered as increasing (decreasing) labour market 
regulation. If a single reform introduced several changes to the legislation (so-called “umbrella laws” 
or reform packages); these changes have been coded separately.   
Overall, a total number of 643 changes to labour market regulation have been registered between 2008 
and 2014 in the 111 countries covered by the compendium.  A clear increase in the number of policy 
interventions has occurred with time. Indeed, the number of changes to labour market regulation 
implemented each year has increased from 63 reforms in 2008 to a maximum of 147 in 2012. The trend 
has then stabilized with 106 changes to labour market regulation registered in 2013; before decreasing 
to 31 changes in 2014.9 Another important result is that the majority of reforms (equal to 69 per cent) 
have been passed in advanced economies; while the remaining 31 per cent was implemented in 
developing and emerging economies.  
The policy compendium shows also a general trend towards relaxing existing levels of workers’ 
protection. Indeed, 56 per cent of the total interventions have reduced existing levels of regulation – 
with this share varying significantly between advanced economies (68 per cent of reforms decreasing 
EPL) and developing ones (32 per cent). This difference can be explained by the fact that governments 
in advanced economies have been faced by rising levels of unemployment and limited fiscal space and 
have eased employment protection legislation in an attempt to incentivize employment growth. By 
contrast, many developing economies have continued in the recent years a more long-term trend 
towards reinforcing labour market institution in an effort of improving employment quality and 
transition to formality (see ILO, 2012a and Adascalitei and Pignatti, 2015). The trend towards relaxing 
labour market regulation has also increased in the period under consideration. Indeed, the share of 
reforms decreasing existing levels of employment protection has gone from 47 per cent of the total 
number of reforms in 2008 to 73 per cent in 2011 and 65 per cent in 2012 – before stabilizing at 48 per 
cent in 2013 and decreasing to 39 per cent in 2014 (Figure 4). 
                                                          
9 Data for 2014 is preliminary. 
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Figure 4: Number of changes in labour market regulation by year of implementation  
 
Note: Data for 2014 is preliminary. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Natlex, EPLex, Eurofound, LABREF and ILO (2012a). 
Overall, the results stemming from the analysis show that the majority of reforms has been implemented 
in the area of permanent employment contracts (193 changes, equal to 30 per cent of the total) (Figure 
5); followed by reforms in collective bargaining regulation (175 changes, equal to 27 per cent) and 
changes to the legislation of temporary employment contracts (87 changes, equal to 14 per cent). Great 
attention has also been devoted to reforming the legislation on working hours (85 changes, 13 per cent), 
collective dismissals (52 changes, 8 per cent) and other forms of employment (51 changes, 8 per cent). 
In general these trends in the number of reforms by policy domain are rather consistent between 
developed and developing economies. However, the former group of countries have reformed relatively 
more in the area of working hours (17 per cent of the total interventions compared to 4 per cent only in 
developing economies); while developing economies have reformed more collective bargaining 
regulations (46 per cent of total reforms compared to 19 per cent in developing economies).  
Finally, the trend towards relaxing labour legislation was common to most areas of policy interventions, 
although some differences emerge. In particular, the share of reforms decreasing existing levels of 
protection has been the highest in the area of working hours (75 per cent), followed by collective 
dismissals (67 per cent), temporary employment contracts (63 per cent) and permanent contracts (59 
per cent). The reforms have instead reinforced protection in 55 per cent of the cases for collective 
bargaining and 71 per cent of the cases for other forms of employment. This result is also confirmed by 
ILO (2015b); which shows how protection of other forms of employment has increased in most 
countries – including EU member states – over the last years. This can be related to the fact that in many 
countries – especially in the EU – workers in other forms of employment (e.g. dependent self-
employees) were more likely to lose their jobs in the aftermath of the recession – given their lower 
dismissal costs – and governments intervened to address this gap in the level of protection. 
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Figure 5: Number of changes in labour market regulation by policy area, 2008-2014 
 
Note: Data for 2014 is preliminary. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Natlex, EPLex, Eurofound, LABREF and ILO (2012a). 
IV. Regional outlook   
Developed economies and European Union 
In advanced economies and the EU a total of 444 changes to labour market regulation have been 
registered between 2008 and 2014 – equal to 69 per cent of the registered changes. These changes have 
mostly concerned the regulation of permanent employment contracts (135 changes), collective 
bargaining legislation (83 changes) and working hours (77 changes). Overall, 68 per cent of these 
changes have decreased existing levels of protection in an effort to facilitate the capacity of firms to 
adjust over the business cycle. Examples include the reduction of severance payments for unjustified 
dismissals in Spain from 45 to 33 days per year worked, the cut from one year to 60 days of the length 
of time employees have to launch an unfair dismissal claim in Portugal and the shortening of the notice 
period from 24 to six months in Greece for workers with at least 28 years of job tenure.10 In other cases, 
the possibility for the employers to adjust working hours over the business cycle has been increased in 
an effort to avoid layoffs. These include increasing the maximum period allowed for the recourse to 
limited working hour schemes in Austria and Germany. Other interventions have instead aimed at 
increasing employment protection for specific categories of workers such as fixed-term employees – 
e.g. restrictions in the admissibility of consecutive fixed-term contracts in Finland – and dependent self-
employees – e.g. shifting the burden of proof of dependent self-employment from the worker to the 
employers in Portugal and Greece. Similarly, in Australia the Fair Work Act approved in 2009 has 
reinforced industrial relations at the firm level by requiring employers to conclude collective 
agreements if the majority of the workers in the company ask them to do so. 
                                                          
10 ILO (2014a, 2013, 2014b), respectively. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Collective
dismissals
Permanent
Contracts
Temporary
Contracts
Working hours Other Forms
of
Employment
Collective
bargaining
Increasing
Decreasing
16 | P a g e  
 
Central and South Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS 
All other geographical regions have registered a lower number of reforms than advanced economies 
and the EU. This can be explained by the less severe impact of the crisis in most of the developing 
countries, as well as the generally more limited role that labour market legislation plays in most 
developing countries – due to, for instance, its enforcement to a smaller share of the workforce.11 In 
Central and South Eastern Europe (non-EU) and the members of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), a total number of 49 changes to labour market regulation have been approved since 2008. 
Policy areas that have been at the centre of reform efforts in this region are the regulation of permanent 
employment contracts (16 changes) and of collective bargaining (14 changes); while relatively less 
attention has been devoted to policy tools specific to crisis periods such as the legislation governing 
collective dismissals (6 changes) and working hours (3 changes). Overall, 47 per cent of these changes 
have reduced workers’ employment protection – while the remaining 53 per cent has reinforced it. In 
some countries, reforms have eased employment protection by eliminating the requirement for third-
party notification in cases of individual dismissals (Montenegro, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan) or increased 
the maximum duration allowed for fixed-term employment contracts (Armenia). In others, employment 
legislation was reinforced by introducing a limit to the maximum number of working hours (40 hours 
per week in Georgia), increasing workers’ right of representation (Moldova and Montenegro), and 
introducing industrial works councils (Russian Federation).  Macedonia is an example of a country that 
reformed extensively its labour legislation across different policy areas. 
South Asia, South-East Asia and the Pacific and East Asia 
Asian countries are those that have reformed the least during the global financial crisis in comparison 
to other regions. This might be related to the more limited role that labour market institutions play in 
the economic policy debate in these countries – given for instance the high level of informality – as well 
as the more limited impact of the global crisis in these regions. Indeed, between 2008 and 2014 a total 
number of 53 changes to labour market regulation has been registered – 33 in South-East Asia and the 
Pacific, 12 in South Asia and 8 in East Asia. Most of the reforms approved in these regions have 
increased existing levels of regulation. In particular, the share of changes that decreased workers’ 
protection has been equal to 28 per cent in South-East Asia and the Pacific, 31 per cent in South Asia 
and 38 per cent in East Asia.  However, in many circumstances concerns remain with respect to the 
coverage of these interventions – given for instance the high levels of informal employment. In many 
countries, the changes approved have aimed at reforming the system of industrial relations – 32 out of 
53 changes have been targeted at collective bargaining systems. For example, national institutions for 
industrial relations and/or dispute resolutions have been introduced and/or their competencies expanded 
in Pakistan, the Maldives and the Philippines; while workers’ right to collective bargaining has been 
reinforced in Bangladesh (no need of approval from factory’s owner to form a trade union) and 
Cambodia (clarification of workers’ rights of organization at the enterprise level). Collective bargaining 
rules have also been reformed in the Republic of Korea – where a multiple-union system has replaced 
the “one company one union” rule12 – as well as in Pakistan. Reform efforts in other policy areas include 
stricter rules for collective dismissals in China, the introduction of a maximum of nine working hours 
                                                          
11 An additional explanation concerns the fact that advanced economies and the EU represent the largest group of 
countries included in the analysis (37 countries covered). 
12 The “one company one union” rule provides that only one trade union is allowed to exist in each company.  In 
the case of the Republic of Korea, prior to 2012, multiple unions were allowed in a single workplace only in cases 
of mergers and acquisitions. 
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per day in Indonesia and the introduction of the requirement of third-party approval for collective 
dismissals in Afghanistan.  
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have registered a total number of 34 changes in labour 
market regulation between 2008 and 2014 – 21 per cent of them decreasing existing levels of 
employment protection. Similarly with the Asian countries, reforms of collective bargaining legislation 
have been the most common (19 changes), followed by changes in the regulation of permanent 
employment contracts (11 changes). At the same time, reforms to temporary employment contracts and 
other forms of employment have been relatively scarce – three and one changes introduced respectively 
– while no change to the legislation of collective dismissals and working hours has been registered in 
the policy compendium for the countries covered in the analysis. Examples of changes to employment 
legislation for permanent workers include the introduction of the right to reinstatement in case of unfair 
dismissal in Barbados and the increase in the notice period for individual dismissals in Brazil. Other 
changes concern the introduction of stricter requirements for the conclusion of new employment 
contracts (that now have to be in written form, Barbados) as well as increasing requirements for 
outsourced employees (Uruguay). On the opposite side, severance payments for permanent employees 
were reduced in Peru. Regarding collective bargaining, a number of reforms have aimed at 
strengthening worker’s rights to representation (e.g. in Colombia and Uruguay). For instance, in 
Bolivia, the law has introduced immunity for trade union leaders and decriminalized the right to strike. 
In other cases, legislation went in the opposite direction – introducing restrictions in the trade unions’ 
right to organize and strike (Panama). Argentina has also continued its efforts to reform labour 
legislation in a process started after the eruption of the 2001 crisis in the country. 
North-Africa, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa 
Finally, 63 changes to labour market regulation have been registered in African countries between 2008 
and 2014 – 19 changes in North Africa and the Middle East and 44 changes in the Sub-Saharan region. 
Among these, 27 have been changes to the regulation of collective bargaining and 21 to the legislation 
of permanent employees.  Seven changes have been implemented to the legislation of temporary 
employment contracts and four to collective dismissals, while the other areas of policy intervention 
have remained mostly untouched. Overall, 32 per cent of the total changes have reduced workers’ 
protection in Sub-Saharan Africa; while the same share is equal to 16 per cent in North Africa and the 
Middle East. In the area of collective bargaining, one of the most frequent interventions has been the 
creation of national fora of social dialogue – in a process of institution building. Among others, this has 
occurred in Angola (National Council for Social Dialogue), Cameroon (Committee for Consultation 
and Monitoring of Social Dialogue) and Congo (National Committee for social Dialogue). Other 
interventions in the area of collective bargaining include reforms in the Central African Republic (the 
law no longer prevents unemployed from joining a trade union) and Egypt (dispute resolution). 
Interventions in other policy areas include the obligation of third-party notification in cases of individual 
and collective dismissals (Congo and Uganda respectively), a new regulation on dismissal procedures 
(Gabon) and the increase in the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts.  
  
18 | P a g e  
 
V. Comparison to other databases  
The interventions analysed in this compendium have produced substantive changes in the existing levels 
of employment regulation. Although the compendium distinguishes between reforms that have 
increased or decreased EPL, it does not allow measuring the impact of these changes on the overall 
level of protection. This is because the compendium (i) does not collect information on the initial level 
of strictness of protection before the crisis and (ii) does not measure the exact impact of the changes 
occurred on this initial level (i.e. it measures only if the change increased and decreased legislation, but 
not by “how much”).   
For these reasons, it is useful to compare the results obtained here with those coming from traditional 
indicators of EPL and collective bargaining legislation.  This is done in order to check the robustness 
of the trends described above to changes in the methodology; while keeping in mind the added value of 
the compendium presented above with respect to traditional indicators of labour market institutions. 
Indeed, this added value lies in the greater ability of the compendium to capture policy responses and 
short-term trends; the more detailed differentiation between areas of policy intervention (e.g. other 
forms of employment, collective bargaining, working times), and the substantially wider country 
coverage – 111 developed and developing economies. 
Keeping in mind these differences, a first comparison of the results of the compendium can be made 
with the OECD indicator of EPL, which is the most widely used indicator of stringency of employment 
legislation – although it covers only around 40 advanced and emerging economies.13 Looking at this 
indicator, mostly confirms the trends described above. In particular, the OECD indicator of EPL for 
regular contracts has decreased between 2008 and 2014 in 14 countries, remained unchanged in 21 
cases and increased in only 5 countries. Additionally and as concluded from this compendium, the 
countries with the sharpest reductions in EPL are EU member states – including Portugal, Estonia and 
Greece. By contrast, countries where the EPL index of employment legislation has increased are 
generally outside the EU – with the exception of Denmark (Figure 6, Panel A).  
Another meaningful comparison can be made using the Cambridge University Centre for Business 
Research’s Labour Regulation Index (CBR-LRI). This indicator expands the geographical coverage of 
the OECD index (including 63 developed and developing economies since the 1970s) and it is based 
on a slightly different methodology.14 The results from CBR-LRI show that, since the beginning of the 
crisis, employment protection for regular workers has decreased in EU member states; while it has 
increased in advanced non-EU economies and emerging economies and it remained stable in developing 
economies. Meanwhile, the indicator measuring employment protection for other forms of employment 
(e.g. part-time, temporary and agency workers) has increased since 2007 in almost all regions – except 
in developing countries, where it has remained stable (Figure 6, Panel B). These results are broadly in 
line with those emerging from the compendium as presented above – showing that the majority of 
reforms on other forms of employment have increased existing levels of workers’ protection. 
  
                                                          
13 The exact number of countries that are covered depends on the different versions of the OECD indicator that 
are used and the years taken into consideration.   
14 See ILO (2015b) for information on the methodology and main trends of the indicator. 
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Figure 6: Change in EPL indicators during the crisis 
Panel A: Change in the OECD EPL indicator between 2008 and 2013 
 
Notes: An increase in the value of the “index” denotes that legislation is more stringent and a reduction in 
the value of the “index” indicates less stringent legislation.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD. 
Panel B: Changes in the CB-LRI indicators of EPL and different forms of employment, 2007-2013 
 
Note: The figure shows the change in the “EPL” indicator and the “Different forms of employment” 
indicator occurred between 2007 and 2013. Each indicator goes from 0 to 1. Data covers 63 countries. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILO (2015b). 
A similar exercise can be conducted by looking at changes in the strictness of collective bargaining 
legislation. Although there is a smaller set of indicators available in this domain, the World Economic 
Forum compiles a useful index of the level of centralization of collective bargaining. This is computed 
by looking at whether wages in an economy are set by a centralized process or rather by each individual 
company independently – with countries raking between these two extremes. Although this does not 
necessarily capture changes in collective bargaining legislation, it might be taken as a valid comparison 
for the results obtained in our database. Indeed, looking at changes in this indicator between 2008 and 
2012 reveals that collective bargaining centralization has increased in all developing countries – with 
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the most relevant increase occurring in Latin America and the Caribbean – while it has remained almost 
unchanged in advanced economies and the EU. Importantly, the result for this latter group would have 
been a decrease in the level of collective bargaining centralization if Australia was to be excluded. This 
reflects the results of the ILO database, which has shown that collective bargaining legislation has been 
reinforced in the majority (55 per cent) of the cases during the crisis; with the notable exception of EU 
member states – where legislation over collective bargaining has been reduced (Figure 7). This latter 
trend has reinforced a longer-term trend of reduction of union density and collective bargaining 
coverage in advanced economies. In particular, between 2000/2001 and 2011/2012, collective 
bargaining coverage has decreased in 27 out of 40 advanced and emerging countries with available 
information.  
VI. Conclusion  
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, many economies embarked upon reforms in order to adjust 
labour markets and prop up aggregate demand. In some regions such as the Euro Area, given that the 
monetary policy was at the hands of the European Central Bank and governments had limited fiscal 
space due to high levels of public debt, labour market reforms were seen as a budget neutral means to 
improve employment outcomes – when compared for instance with active labour market policies or 
unemployment subsidies. The database presented in this paper – covering 111 countries, both advanced 
and developing and emerging – shows that there have been a total number of 643 changes to labour 
market regulation between 2008 and 2014. In terms of the regional breakdown of labour market reforms, 
advanced economies and EU member states have been those most actively engaged, followed by 
countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe and CIS, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America 
respectively. 
Figure 7:  Changes in the level of centralization of collective bargaining (2008-2012) 
 
Note: The figure presents changes in the index of centralization of collective bargaining between 2008 and 
2012. Importantly, the indicator is taken from the World Competitiveness Report, but modified on a 0-10 scale 
and multiplied by -1. This is done such that an increase (decrease) in the indicator corresponds to an increase 
(decrease) in the level of centralization of collective bargaining. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the World Competitiveness Report Database. 
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Furthermore,  the analysis of this global database shows that there has been a general trend towards 
relaxing existing levels of workers’ protection – 56 per cent of the total interventions have reduced 
existing levels of regulation – with this share varying significantly between advanced economies (68 
per cent of reforms decreasing EPL) and developing ones (32 per cent). Meanwhile, labour market 
regulation reforms have covered a number of different policy domains, although the reform intensity 
differed across areas of intervention. In particular, there have been 193 changes to the legislation 
governing hiring and firing procedures for permanent employees; while 173 changes have been 
approved to the collective bargaining legislation – with their incidence particularly high in developing 
countries. Other areas of intensive reforms have been the regulation over temporary employment 
contracts, working hours, collective dismissals. 
The global and regional trends presented by our database match the ones that already exist in terms of 
the direction of the reforms. However, as it is evident from the paper, our database is more 
comprehensive in both country coverage and types of labour market reforms. Going forward, there is a 
need to include more countries and come up with an index that accurately captures the state of reforms 
and their general efficacy. There are existing databases such as the OECD database that does this, but 
they provide only a limited understanding of the state of employment protection legislation beyond the 
rich world. The CBR-LRI indicator makes an important step to improve country coverage. This paper 
is an attempt to fill that gap in the study of labour institutions by looking at reforms in a specific period 
of time – the Great Recession – and draw conclusions on the state of labour market institutions in the 
countries covered.    
  
22 | P a g e  
 
Appendix A: Main sources of information on employment protection and collective 
bargaining legislation 
Data presented in this paper on the main trends of reforms to employment protection and collective 
bargaining legislation (Section III) comes from a variety of legal and economic sources. In particular, 
we use both national and international databases collecting qualitative information on legislative 
measures in the area of employment legislation and – when possible – cross-checked the gathered 
information with primary sources. Given the wide range of countries that are covered in this paper, we 
limited the analysis of the legislative measures to those aspects that could be consistently compared 
across databases and countries. The table below presents the main international sources of information 
used for completing the database.  
Main international databases on labour legislation used in the analysis 
Name of 
database 
Institution 
in charge 
Country 
coverage Brief description Web-link 
LABour 
market 
REForm 
database 
(LABFREF) 
European 
Commission 
EU member 
states 
(changing 
composition) 
Collects information on measures 
adopted by EU member states in 
different policy domains of labour 
legislation. For each measure, it 
presents the year of implementation a 
brief description and the direction of 
the reform (increasing or decreasing 
strictness of legislation). 
http://ec.europa.eu/so
cial/main.jsp?catId=1
143&langId=en 
Database of 
national 
labour, social 
security and 
related human 
rights 
legislation 
(NATLEX) 
International 
Labour 
Organization 
196 countries 
Contains information on measures 
undertaken in the areas of labour, 
social security and human rights 
legislation. Provides links to relevant 
legislation and a short description of 
the policies. 
http://www.ilo.ch/dy
n/natlex/natlex4.hom
e?p_lang=en 
Employment 
protection 
legislation 
database 
(EPLex) 
International 
Labour 
Organization 
95 countries 
Provides information on the legislation 
governing key topics on employment 
termination, with a breakdown of more 
than 50 variables to facilitate cross-
country comparability. 
http://www.ilo.org/d
yn/eplex/termmain.h
ome 
In Section V of the paper, we compared the results obtained in our analysis with the main trends 
registered since 2008 by traditional indicators of strictness of employment legislation. Although the 
database presented in this paper follows a different methodology and does not aim to assess the overall 
level of workers’ protection (and its variation over time), these indicators represent useful benchmarks 
to test the validity of our approach. Unfortunately, these indicators are available only for a limited 
number of countries – compared to the 111 economies covered in our database. The table below presents 
the main indicators used for comparing trends in employment legislation. 
 
 
 
23 | P a g e  
 
  
Indicators of employment legislation and collective bargaining 
          
Name of 
database 
Institution 
in charge 
Country 
coverage Brief description Web-link 
Indicator of 
Employment 
Protection 
Organisation 
for Economic 
Co-operation 
and 
Development 
43 
countries 
Measures the stringency of 
legislation for dismissing workers 
individually or collectivelly as 
well as the procedures needed to 
hire indidividuals on fixed-term or 
temporary work agency contracts. 
http://www.oecd.org/employ
ment/emp/oecdindicatorsofe
mploymentprotection.htm 
Database on 
Institutional 
Characteristics of 
Trade Unions, 
Wage Setting, 
State Intervention 
and Social Pacts 
Amsterdam 
Institute for 
Advanced 
Labour Studies 
34 
countries 
Collects a wide range of 
information of collective 
bargaining legislation and 
developments, including issues 
such as workers' rights of 
association, social pacts and level 
of coordination of collective 
agreements.  
http://www.uva-aias.net/208 
World 
Competitiveness 
Report Database 
World 
Economic 
Forum 
144 
countries 
The Database is constructed 
around 12 pillars that define 
competitiveness (e.g. institutions, 
macroeconomic environment, 
skills, labour market efficiency). 
http://www.weforum.org/repor
ts/global-competitiveness-
report-2014-2015 
Labour 
Regulation Index 
Cambridge 
University 
Centre for 
Business 
Research 
63 
countries 
The indicator is constructed using 
40 variables, grouped in 5 sub-
indices: different forms of 
employment, working time, 
dismissal, employee representation 
and industrial action. 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/filea
dmin/user_upload/centre-for-
business-
research/downloads/working-
papers/wp458.pdf 
24 | P a g e  
 
References 
Acharya, V.V., Baghai-QWadji, R. and Susbramanian, K. 2009. “Labor Laws and Innovation”, 
Discussion Paper No. 7171, CEPR, London, UK. 
Adascalitei, D. and Pignatti, C. 2015. “Labour market reforms since the crisis: Drivers and 
consequences”, ILO Research Paper Series. ILO, Geneva (forthcoming) 
Allard, G.J. and Lindert, P.H. 2007. “Euro-Productivity and Euro-Jobs since the 1960s: Which 
Institutions Really Mattered?”, in T.J. Hatton, K.H. O’Rourke and A.M. Taylor (Eds.), 
The New Comparative Economic History: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey G. Williamson, 
Cambridge, MA, US and London, UK, MIT Press. 
Almeida, R.K.; Carneiro, P. 2008. Enforcement of labor regulation and firm size, SP 
Discussion Paper No. 0814 (Washington, DC, World Bank). 
Amadeo, Edward J., Gill, Indermit, S. Gill and Neri, M. 2000. “Brazil: The Pressure Points in 
Labor Legislation”. Ensaios Economicos da EPGE n. 395. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C. and Malo, M.A. 2008. "How are fixed-term contracts used by firms? An 
analysis using gross job and worker flows", Research in Labor Economics, Vol. 28, pp. 
277-304. 
Baccaro, L. and Rei, D. 2007. “Institutional Determinants of Unemployment in OECD 
Countries: Does the Deregulatory View Hold Water”, International Organization, Vol. 
61, pp. 527-69. 
Bassanini, A., Garnero, A., Marianna, P., Martin, S. 2009. “Institutional determinants of 
worker flows: A cross-country/cross-industry approach”, OECD Social, employment and 
migration paper No. 107 
Bentolila, S. and Dolado, J.J. 1994. “Labour flexibility and wages, lessons from Spain”, 
Economic Policy, 18, 54–99. 
Bentolila, S., Izquierdo, M. and Jimeno, J.F. 2012. “Negociación colectiva: La gran reforma 
pendiente.” Papeles de Economía Española, 124, 176‐192. 
Bertola, G., Boeri, T. and Cazes, S. 2000. "Employment Protection in Industrialized Countries: 
The Case for New Indicators", International Labour Review, Vol. 139, No. 1, pp. 57-72. 
Besley, T.; Burgess, R. 2004. “Can labor regulation hinder economic performance? Evidence 
from India”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 1, pp. 91–134 
Blanchard, O. and Wolfers, J. 2000. “The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of 
European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence”, Economic Journal, Vol. 110, C1-
C33. 
Blanchard, O. and Galí J. 2007. “Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model.” 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 39(S1): 35–65. 
25 | P a g e  
 
—. 2010. “Labor Markets and Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Model with 
Unemployment”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 1–
30. 
Boeri, T., Garibaldi, P. and Ribeiro, M. 2010. "Behind Lighthouse Effect," IZA DP No. 4890. 
Boeri, T.; Helppie, B. and Macis, M. 2008. Labor Regulations in Developing Countries : A 
Review of the Evidence and Directions for Future Research, Social Protection Discussion 
Paper No. 0833. 
Botero, J.C., Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Sinales, F. and Shleifer, A. 2004. “The 
Regulation of Labor”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, pp. 1339-82. 
Bruno, M., and Sachs, J. D. 1985. Economics of worldwide stagflation, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Caballero, R.J., Cowan, K.N., Engel, E.M.R.A. and Micco, A. 2004. “Effective Labor 
Regulation and Microeconomic Flexibility”, Working Paper 10744, NBER, Cambridge, 
MA, US. 
Calmors, L., and Driffill, J. 1988. “Centralization and wage bargaining”, Economic Policy, 
Vol. 3, No. 1, pp.  13-61. 
Cazes, N. and Nesporova, A. 2007. “Labour Markets in Central and South-Eastern Europe: 
From Transition to Stabilization”, in S. Cazes and A. Nesporova (Eds.) Flexicurity: A 
Relevant Approach in Central and Eastern Europe, Geneva, Switzerland, ILO. 
Cazes, S. and Verick, S. 2013. Perspectives on Labour Economics for Development, Geneva, 
Switzerland, ILO.  
Cazes, S., Khatiwada, S. and Malo, M.Á. 2012. “Employment Protection and Collective 
Bargaining: Beyond the Deregulation Agenda”, Employment Working Papers Nº 133, 
ILO, Geneva, Switzerland. 
Djankov, S. and Ramalho, R. 2009. “Employment laws in developing countries”, Journal of 
Comparative Economics 37, 3-13. 
Feldmann, H. 2003. “Labor Market Regulation and Labor Market Performance: Evidence 
Based on Surveys among Senior Business Executives”, Kyklos, Vol. 56, pp. 509-539. 
—. 2009. “The Unemployment Effects of Labor Regulation around the World.” Journal of 
Comparative Economics, Vol. 37, pp. 76-90. 
Freeman, R.B. 2010. “Labor regulations, unions, and social protection in developing countries: 
Market distortion or efficient institutions”, in D. Rodrik and M. R. Rosenzweig (eds): 
Handbook of development economics (North Holland, Elsevier). 
26 | P a g e  
 
García-Martínez, P. and M.A. Malo. 2007. “The Strategic Use of Dismissal Legislation: An 
Empirical Analysis Using Spanish Data”, European Journal of Law and Economics, 23, 
151-167. 
García-Serrano, C. 2008. "Job satisfaction, union membership and collective bargaining", 
European Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 91-111. 
Garibaldi, P. and Violante, G.L. 2005. “The Employment Effects of Severance Payments with 
Wage Rigidities”, Economic Journal, Vol. 115, pp. 799-832. 
Golden, M.A. and Londregan, J.B. 2006. “Centralization of bargaining and wage inequality: A 
correction of Wallerstein”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 
208-213. 
Gómez-Salvador, R.; J. Messina and G.. Vallanti, 2004. “Gross Job Flows in Europe”, Labour 
Economics, 11: 469-485. 
Griffith, R., Harrison, R. and Macartney, G. 2007. “Product Market Reforms, Labour Market 
Institutions and Unemployment”, Economic Journal, Vol. 117, C142-C166. 
Haltiwanger, J., Scarpetta, S. and Schweiger, H. 2006. “Assessing Job Flows across Countries: 
The Role of Industry, Firm Size and Regulations, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2450. 
Hayter, S. 2011. The Role of Collective Bargaining in the Global Economy. Negotiating for 
Social Justice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward ElgarPublishing – International Labour 
Organization. 
Hayter, S. and Weiberg, B. 2011. “Mind the gap: collective bargaining and wage inequality”, 
chapter 6 in Hayter (2011), pp. 136-186. 
Heckman, J.J. and Pagés-Serra, C. 2000. “The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence from 
Latin American Labor Markets”, Economía, Vol. 1, pp. 109-44. 
ILO 2012a. Better Jobs for a Better Economy. World of Work Report 2012. International 
Institute for Labour Studies, International Labour Organization, Geneva (Switzerland). 
—. 2012b. "Statistical update on employment in the informal economy," ILO, Department of 
Statistics, Geneva (Switzerland).     
—. 2013. Portugal: Tackling the Jobs Crisis. Studies on Growth with Equity. Geneva 
(Switzerland). 
—. 2014a. Spain: Growth with Jobs. Studies on Growth with Equity. Geneva (Switzerland). 
—. 2014b. Greece: Productive Jobs. Studies on Growth with Equity. Geneva (Switzerland). 
—. 2015a. World Employment and Social Outlook - Trends 2015. Geneva (Switzerland). 
—. 2015b. World Employment and Social Outlook: The Changing Nature of Jobs. Geneva 
(Switzerland). 
27 | P a g e  
 
Kahn, L.M. 1998. “Against the wind: bargaining recentralisation and wage inequality in 
Norway 1987-1991”, Economica, Vol. 65, No. 260, pp. 507-534. 
Lafontaine, F.; Sivadasan, J. 2009. “Do labor market rigidities have microeconomics effects? 
Evidence from within the firm”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 
1, No. 2, pp. 88–127. 
Lazear, E. 1990. “Job Security Provisions and Employment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 105, pp. 699-726. 
Maloney, W. F. and Nuñez, J. 2004. “Measuring the Impact of Minimum Wages: Evidence 
from Latin America”. In J. Heckman and C. Pagés (eds.), Law and Employment. Lessons 
from Latin America and the Caribbean. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Messina, J. and Vallanti. G. 2007. “Job Flow Dynamics and Firing Restrictions: Evidence from 
Europe”, Economic Journal, Vol. 117, F279-F301. 
Micco, A.; Pagés, C. 2006. The economic effects of employment protection: Evidence from 
international industry-level data, Discussion Paper No. 2433 (Bonn, Institute for the 
Study of Labour (IZA)). 
Muller, A. 2011. “Employment protection legislation tested by the economic crisis. A global 
review of the regulation of collective dismissals for economic reasons”, ILO 
DIALOGUE in Brief No. 3. 
Neri, M., Gonzaga, G. and Camargo, J. M. 2000. "Efeitos Informais do Salário Mínimo e 
Pobreza". Texto para discussão n. 724, IPEA 
OECD. 1997. “Economic Performance and the Structure of Collective Bargaining” in OECD 
Employment Outlook 1997. OECD Publishing, Paris.  
Nickell, S. 1997. “Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North 
America”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 55-74. 
Skedinger,  P. 2010. Employment Protection Legislation. Evolution, Effects, Winners and 
Losers. Edward Elgar. 
Skedinger, P. 2011. “Employment Consequences of Employment Protection Legislation”, IFN 
Working Paper No. 865, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
Souza, P. and Baltar P. 1980. "Salario Minimo E Taxa De Salarios No Brasil — Replica", 
Pesquisa e Planejamento Economico, 10:1045-1058. 
Traxler, F. 1994. “Collective Bargaining: Levels and Coverage”. Chapter in OECD, 
Employment Outlook, 1994: 167-94. 
Traxler, F. and Brandl, B. 2011. “The Economic Impact of Collective Bargaining Coverage”. 
Chapter in Hayter (2011). 
28 | P a g e  
 
Venn, D. 2009. “Legislation, collective bargaining and enforcement: Updating the OECD 
employment protection indicators”, Working Paper 89 (Directorate for Employment, 
Labour and Social Affairs, OECD, Paris). 
 Wallerstein, M. 1999. “Wage-setting institutions and pay inequality in advanced industrial 
societies”, American Journal of Political Science, 43(3), 649-680. 
